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Abstract 
Security analysts, analyst forecast and market reaction are anecdotal 
in restructuring transactions, sometime conflicting and some other 
time imperative to the process of transaction.  This article attempts to 
highlight a consistent association between analyst, market reaction 
and corporate restructuring.  A  close  intermediation between those 
themes  is  analysed  in  this  article,  implying  the  relationship  is 
contiguous.  However  issues  of  delayed  price  adjustment, 
conglomerate  stock  break-ups  and  negative  earnings  surprises  are 
not discussed in this paper, though   such factors are ingeniously 
important and crucial to the process of corporate restructuring.  
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Introduction 
 
     The volatility of stock price following restructuring has been a concern for 
firms and industry over decades. The premise behind restructuring entails a better 
value for share holders’ return subsequently leading to enhanced performance of the 
firms.  Nevertheless,  the  principal  and  agent  conflict  remains  as  the  foremost 
determinant of restructuring. Most often security analysts signal information about the 
behaviour of share price to the investors, which in turn facilitates them to rationalise 
their expectation about the firms’ future. Security analysts mainly rely on traditional 
indicators like price-earning-ratios, denoted as share price to its earnings per share 
and  ‘q’  ratios,  i.e.,  firms’  market  capitalisation to  the  book  value  of  its  assets  to 
predict stock market. However the uncertainty surrounding stock market not always 
been  reflected  accurately  by  analysts  forecast.  The  information  asymmetry  in 
conjunction with efficient market hypothesis, such as anyone trading on the public 
domain information can not earn a risk-adjusted return in excess of the information 
rather can only gain an overall return on the stock market on pure speculation remains 
debatable.  In  this  paper  a  thematic  discussion  has  been  presented  drawing  upon 
arguments  from  the  extant  literature.  In  the  main  the  constituent  role  of  security 
analysts in corporate restructuring has been evaluated in the terms of market reaction.  
    The Economist and the World Bank in 2000 documented that the economies 
of Eastern Asia has registered a three times faster growth than the analysts forecasted 
a year ago. South Korea’s GDP rose by 11%, Malaysia experienced a 6% growth, so 
as Indonesia and Thailand achieved 6% rise in their GDP during 2000(ADB, 2000). 
On  such  occasions  the  phenomenon  of  growth  has  been  attributed  to  concerted 
economic and financial restructuring of the industries in those countries. Moreover in 
East  Asia  after  post  crisis  era,  corporate  restructuring  was  perceived  as  a   4 
comprehensive institutional framework to address corporate malaise. Over last 3 three 
decades  similar measures  were  decided  on  to  reform  and  institutionalise financial 
retirements  in  European  and  trans-Atlantic  countries.  Singh  (1993)  outlines  that 
unlike the highly acquisitive period in the late 1960s; the 1980s have been marked by 
high  levels  of  acquisitions,  divestitures  and  buyouts.  Sell-offs  and  changes  in 
ownership structures are meaningful and popular in terms of potential impact they 
bring  to  the  adjustment  of  capital  structure  of  the  firms  and  lowering  of  agency 
problems  within  relatively  short  span  of  time  compared  to  expansion  activities. 
Further Singh (1993) opines that restructuring is often considered by companies only 
after  a  period  of  sustained  poor  performance,  culminating  in  action  taken  by 
stakeholders against them when they have wearied of accepting continued defaults in 
payment and/or breaches of undertakings given, including financial covenants. 
Traditionally the firms are averse to continue with default debt to equity ratio 
lest the performance would decline. Typically a follow up scenario of restructuring is 
uncertainty where the value of any asset is not equal to the present discounted value 
of the future cash flow.  Thus the stock market value does not reflect the present value 
of  expected  future  dividend  to  shareholders;  discounted  at  the  appropriate  risk 
adjusted interest payment. The outweighed debt to net present value of firms remains 
as a  fundamental caveat  concerning  the  firms’ future.  Essentially  firms  opt  many 
ways to resolve untenable debts, some better than others. The best conceived way for 
a firm is to raise new equity and liquidate non-core businesses and assets to off-set 
debt  by  restructuring  either  operationally  or  financially.  This  makes  firms  to 
disengage  from  less  profitable  or  loss-making  businesses  by  downsizing  and 
stipulating  necessary  financial  exercise  to  increase  its  earnings  and  debt-service 
capacity. In some instances creditors reach at a consensus to convert debt into equity   5 
or lower-yielding convertible bonds, though in practice most creditors, particularly 
institutional investors have serious reservation about this. The reason creditors are 
averse to such practices is that converting debt in to equity does not always capture 
the buoyancy of stock market.  However creditors should not consider debt write-offs 
until  they  have  exhausted  all  other  possibilities,  and  they  should  obtain  some 
instrument; such as equity, options, or warrants to protect their interest and participate 
in any recovery. In the light of Eastern Asian economic crisis, Backham (1999) and 
Haley (2000) suggest restructuring is a best effective way of addressing such issues in 
corporate sectors. However the benefit of restructuring has always been controversial 
and  elusive  but  essentially  it  facilitates  consolidation  of  firms’  operational  and 
financial  covenants.  Interestingly  though  stock  momentum  looks  promising 
immediately after restructuring but in long run investors do not perceive that as the 
best  signal  for investment even if analysts  favour the trend,  rather they opt for a 
caution for the reason of negative stock surprise. 
Security Analysts: Do they monitor? 
Most often the role of security analyst in modus operandi of restructuring is 
perceived  as  key  constituent  of  major  decision  making  process.  Doukas  and  Kim 
(2000) argue security analysts act as a monitoring mechanism to reduce the agency 
cost associated with separation of ownership and control of the firm. In essence, the 
separation  of agent and principals’  interest underpins the process of restructuring. 
Traditionally analysts forecast works as an index  for stock  market and influences 
investors’ preferential decisions. Security analysts, therefore undertake measures to 
illustrate the volatility of market with caution, particularly following restructuring. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) observed that the monitoring activity of security analysis 
helps reduce the agency costs related with the separation of ownership and control by   6 
restraining  the  managers  to  non  value  maximising  activities.  Nonetheless, 
restructuring  activities  are  essentially  undertaken  to  mitigate  this  conflict.  
Interestingly  Doukas  and  Kim  (1998)  reported  that  monitoring  of  multi-segment 
companies  by  security  analysts  fails  to  add  shareholder  value.  As  evidenced,  if 
analysts fail to add value to shareholders, the purpose of restructuring is obviously not 
attained, which necessarily needs to maximise shareholders return. In that instance, 
the role of analysts is taken with scepticism both by market and investors. 
However stock prices supposed to change effectively in analysts forecast of 
earnings than they do change in earnings themselves, showing the crucial importance 
of analysts earnings forecast. Security analysts enhance the firm specific information 
transparency by disseminating the information and increasing interest among potential 
investors.  However  information  in  public  domain  influences  investors’  preference 
over  analyst’s  decision, no  matter  how  astute they can be. Restructuring  signifies 
value and performance changes of firms, which often taken as an institutional axiom. 
Nevertheless, in effect the creation of value essentially differs for different types of 
restructuring. In this context Jensen and Meckling (1976) outline that security analysts 
impart a positive influence on firm value. Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) document 
abnormal returns in tender offers which is related to the Tobin’s q ratio of the target 
and bidder. Furthermore they add that bidders with high Tobin’s q have significant 
positive abnormal returns when they engage in restructuring transactions. They report 
that the best takeovers in terms of value creation are those with higher Tobin’s q. In 
practice market react more to dividend changes of low q firms than to those of high q 
firms during share repurchases as a form of restructuring transactions. Most of the 
studies take five major performance measures to explain firm value and performance 
effects  following  restructuring  transactions,  such  as;  abnormal  return  on  stock,   7 
expenses/revenue, cash flow/ market value of the assets, return on equity and return 
on assets. The cash flow to market value of assets improve relative to industry, return 
on equity also improve relative to the industry, where as there is a positive significant 
abnormal  return  during  announcement  period resulting a cumulative excess  return 
over the period of 1-3 years. The positive significant abnormal return mainly indicates 
that analysts’ forecast has underlying effect in swaying investors’ decision.   
Womack  (1996)  found  that  stock  prices  are  duly  influenced  by  analyst 
forecast. Following a restructuring, when investors and market is interested to learn 
more  about  stock  performance,  analysts  provide  information  which  incentives 
shareholders risk adjusted return bringing in further investment from market. Doukas, 
McKnight and Pantzalis( 2002) say despite the enormous growth of the information 
intermediaries industry, little is know about the influence of analyst coverage may 
have  on  firm  value  and  the  agency  cost  problem  between  managers  and  outside 
shareholders  in  the  UK  settings.  Further,  effectiveness  of  analyst  coverage  in 
restructuring and how it restricts the agency conflict is very sketchy. Moyer, Chatfield 
and  Sisneros  (1989)  confirmed  Jensen  and  Meckling’s  finding  and  indicated  that 
analyst presence works as a potential monitoring mechanism in reducing agency cost. 
Also they reported evidence in support of stock prices are influenced by the analysts’ 
forecast of earnings growth rates than historical growth rate measures. They further 
added that analysts could play an important role in making the security market more 
information  efficient  so  the  controlling  mechanism  for  agency  conflict  should  be 
positively related to the potential economic value of the information being generated. 
Their study is consistent with the evidence provided by Linke (1982); Peterson and 
Peterson  (1982);  Stanley,  Lewellen,  and  Schlarbaum  (1984);  and  Timme  and 
Eisemann  (1986).  No  doubt,  reduction  of  agency  cost  is  the  key  reason  behind   8 
undertaking restructuring, but does restructuring really address the issue? If it does, 
does  the  reduction  of  agency  cost  really  restricts  negative  NPV  investments  of 
managers?   
Every  restructuring  announcement  and  process  has  its  own  benefit  of 
informing outside investors to rationalise the information in their advantage. However 
market does not always depicts a clear picture about share prices as much as analysts 
do. A number of theoretical studies suggest that the payment in restructuring activities 
related to the value of firms has a favourable effect on stock prices over a positive 
market reaction (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Fishman, 1989; and Brown and Ryngaert, 
1991). Similarly Kaplan (1989) and Lichtenberg & Siegel (1989) found increased 
performance  measures  for  the  restructured  firms  suggesting  that  this  enhanced 
performance is attributable to restructuring in sending a signal bearing positive effect 
on  market;  which  subsequently  reflects  how  market  reacts  to  the  restructuring 
announcement  and  maximises  the  market  value  of  the  restructured  firms.  This 
examines  evidence  from  value  maximisation  hypothesis.  This  hypothesis  has  two 
prominent aspects.  First, the enhanced value maximisation hypothesis, which predicts 
that initially the market will regard restructuring more favourably in response to value 
maximisation  than  performance  enhancement  subsequently  leading  to  later  one. 
Second, this provides evidence showing that the market’s response to restructuring 
announcement has changed compared with past research, and further that there has 
been a change over the last decade. In this regard, the results found in the research of 
Chan(2001)  provides  evidence  in  favour  of  the  enhanced  value  maximisation 
hypothesis,  as  firms  on  average  earn  positive  abnormal  returns  following  the 
announcement,  compared  with  negative  abnormal  returns  for  companies  in  more 
stable  industries.  Significantly  analysts’  coverage  contributes  to  realise  positive   9 
abnormal return on firms bringing investments form market, though the negative NPV 
investments of restructured firms’ manager is not accurately explained . Furthermore, 
his findings also show that investors perceive restructuring add positive value to the 
firms.  
The market reaction to the abnormal positive return of stock prices implies 
value creation through restructuring for the firms. In a different note, it is reasonably 
perceived that the effect of different restructuring transactions on analysts'  forecasts 
usually  assessed  by  both  forecast  accuracy  and  dispersion.  On  the  contrary  what 
market and investor achieve after restructuring, Chaney et al. (1999) provide evidence 
that analyst forecast accuracy is impaired by restructuring. However, they find no 
robust link between prior restructuring events and forecast accuracy. In contrast to the 
findings of Chaney et al., Lopez and Clement (2000) predict that analysts will learn 
from prior restructuring charges and have positive impact on firm’s value. This result 
is consistent with the findings of Hanna (1999). Though, their results outline that 
restructuring  creates  uncertainty  for  analysts  that  lasts  for  at  least  two  years 
subsequent to the announcement of the event. He further adds that types of transaction 
influence the analysts’ coverage by providing information to investors to follow the 
market reaction. However, Hong and Stein (1999) make two key assumptions about 
analysts’ forecast in terms of restructuring, first; firm specific information diffuses 
gradually  across  the  investing  public,  second;  investors  can  not  perform  rational 
expectation extracting information from price. Following this argument Gilson et al. 
(2001)  suggested  that  analysts  work  as  a  conduit  to  generate  information  for  the 
investing  public  informing  them  about  the  performance  of  the  firms  on  the 
announcement of restructuring and following afterward. Furthermore, they implied 
that  types  of  restructuring  have  crucial  influence  on  analyst  forecast.  Similarly   10 
Nandelstadh and Sandvall (2001) reported that analysts forecast significantly vary on 
the characteristics of value involved with restructuring. In the main the sequential and 
simultaneous warnings have different anecdotal evidence for one key content, i.e., it 
conjectures  analysts’  reputation.  The  negative  and  positive  warning  following  a 
restructuring traditionally rely upon retrospective questions faced by industry, which 
subsequently warrants analysts to base their forecast on. However such aspects are 
more elaborately discussed in cognitive finance literature, which we believe is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
Conclusion 
Analysts  essentially  play  a  major  role  prior  and  posterior  to  restructuring, 
though market reaction do not always relate to forecast accuracy and firm evaluation 
in  terms  of  earning  based  systematic  difference  on  perceived  credibility  of 
management. Further, the restructured firms sometimes impair their market position 
by  showing  inadvertent  proclivity  towards  the  analysts’  forecasts.  Nevertheless 
debriefing the above discussing it emerges consistent with main empirical-archival 
literature that analysts and forecasting process are involved with significant under 
reaction and overreaction both by market participants, i.e., investors and shareholders 
alike. A more detailed exploration in this context is imperative, which needs further 
investigation to duly realise the dynamic nature of restructuring, analysts’ forecasts 
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